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Introduction
A number of proposals and movements aiming at alleviating the negative effects 
of intellectual property regimes have gained popularity during the last decade and 
a half. The interdisciplinary character of the discussion has made compliance with 
human rights a standard assessment tool. The revisions to the existing regimes are, 
deliberately or not, far from addressing all issues that need to be dealt with, and 
mostly do not aim at offering an ideal solution. For the sake of political feasibility 
a number of concessions have been made in the proposals to gain governmental 
support, some of which have been severely criticized. The aim of this article is to 
provide an assessment on how the current intellectual property regimes along with 
six major proposals and movements that aim to improve such regimes relate to 
human rights commitments. The discussed proposals are the Health Impact Fund, 
prize systems, open innovation models, strengthening South-South partnerships, 
the Access to Knowledge movement, and the strategic use of compulsory licensing. 
A brief introduction to the nature of human rights obligations will be provided, 
followed by an overview of the human rights affected by intellectual property rights. 
Thereafter the strengths and weaknesses of each proposal will be discussed. Finally, 
an evaluation will be offered on how the proposals relate to three different priority 
criteria: potential to secure basic needs, overall compatibility with human rights law 
and orientation towards the interests of future people. Throughout this analysis I 
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will provide a comprehensive list of conflicting items with the aim of building a 
map where the different stakeholders’ position can be identified.
I. magnitude of the problem
Intellectual property rights have a far-reaching impact that not only affects the lives 
of producers and buyers of developed inventions, but also society at large. Keep-
ing a vital medicine as an artificially scarce resource using exclusive rights causes 
public outrage, especially when the strict market orientation of private companies 
results in the avoidable loss of lives1.
There are a number of urgent global problems that need to be handled. Climate 
change is threatening future food provision2. Disease and malnutrition have an 
annual death toll of over 18 million people3. Increased social consciousness has 
crystallized in a number of organizations, institutions and individuals offering 
solutions. Science and technological innovation are among the institutions from 
which support is expected and solicited. In order for science and technology to 
deliver solutions that actively tackle those global problems the incentive system 
that drives research and development will have to be aligned to meet societal 
needs4. Shaping research agendas according to market demands as increasingly 
is done results in the poor often not getting the innovations they need (i.e. the 
availability problem). Profit-maximizing sales practices systematically leave people 
empty-handed (i.e. the accessibility problem). 
It is often forgotten that the wide use of intellectual property rights dictates a 
specific type of scientific conduct that might be at odds with local customs, endan-
gering diversity in science. Additionally, there is a general trend to favour break-
through science at the cost of grassroots innovation. Lastly, those rights are very 
restrictive, limiting participation possibilities and decision-making opportunities. 
Research and development in the life sciences has great potential to alleviate 
the disease burden and malnutrition problems of the global poor, but this potential 
is currently underused. This is something that we as a society have come to grips 
with due to the enormous existing welfare problems around the world. At the 
turn of the new century a wide range of promises to the global poor and ourselves 
1. Cristian Timmermann & Henk van den Belt, Intellectual property and global 
health: from corporate social responsibility to the access to knowledge movement, 34 Liverpool 
Law Review 47 (2013).
2. William R. Cline, Global warming and agriculture: impact estimates by country 
(Center for Global Development, 2007).
3. Thomas W. Pogge, World poverty and human rights: cosmopolitan responsibilities and 
reforms (Polity 2nd ed., 2008).
4. Cf. Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group, Fatal Imbalance: The Crisis 
in Research and Development for Drugs for Neglected Diseases (Médecins Sans Frontières 
2001); Michiel Korthals & Cristian Timmermann, Reflections on the International 
Networking Conference “Ethical and Social Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights” – Agrifood 
and Health held in Brussels, September 2011, 3 Synesis G66 (2012); Seed policies and the 
right to food: enhancing agrobiodiversity and encouraging innovation (Report presented to 
the UN General Assembly, 64th session, UN doc. A/64/170). (2009). 
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were made to reduce those welfare deficits5. Progress however has been miserable 
and the first target deadlines are approaching, meaning that we have to prepare 
to justify our failings6. Despite the urgency of these issues, we still have the duty 
to ask ourselves what sacrifices are too high when trying to promote efficiency 
in research and development aiming at alleviating those pressing problems. Any 
reform attempt might be in jeopardy when the progressive realization7 of other 
human rights is endangered. Perhaps one of the main lessons learned in the last 
century is that even for the noblest goals we should critically judge the means used 
for their promotion. Therefore, while pursuing access to medicines it is still es-
sential to be able to give a clear justification if in the process some rights are being 
neglected or even violated. A one-sided focus on basic necessities may undermine 
the triumph of having being able to agree as a global society on a comprehensive 
list of universally recognized human rights8.
II. Today’s intellectual property regimes and their alternatives
Intellectual property is a social construct that aims at stimulating innovation by 
ensuring temporary exclusive rights for those who can successfully claim author-
ship. Innovators gain by having the opportunity to recoup reasonable research and 
development costs. Society benefits from these intellectual endeavours by having a 
wider set of products in the market and once temporary exclusive rights elapse, also 
by having more knowledge entering the public domain for free further exploitation. 
Especially after the Agreement on Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property 
Rights (1994, hereinafter trips) started to become effective minimal protection 
levels became internationally standardized and binding. Thereafter many of those 
minimal protection guarantees have been raised through bilateral trade agreement9, 
which are automatically generalized through the “most favoured nation” rule10, as 
5. Most prominently the Millennium Development Goals, in relation to food security 
cf. Willem van Genugten et al., Harnessing Intellectual Property Rights for Development 
Objectives (Wolf Legal Pub., 2011). 
6. Substantive criticism on the measurement of progress toward meeting the Millennium 
Development Goals is offered by Thomas W. Pogge, Politics as usual: what lies behind 
the pro-poor rhetoric 57-74 (Polity, 2010). and Thomas W. Pogge & Mitu Sengupta, 
Rethinking the Post-2015 Development Agenda: Eight Ways to End Poverty Now, 7 Global 
Justice: Theory Practice Rhetoric (2014).
7. Cf. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted 10 Dec. 1948, G.A. Res. 217A 
(iii), U.N. gaor, 3d Sess., U.N. Doc. A/RES/3/217A (1948) [hereinafter udhr], preamble; 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted 16 Dec. 1966, 
G. A. Res. 2200 (xxi), U.N. gaor, 21st Sess, art. 2, 6, 9, 11–14, U.N. Doc. A/6316 
(1966), 993 u.n.t.s. 3 (entered into force 3 Jan. 1976) [hereinafter icescr], art. 2.1
8. Strengths and weaknesses of having human rights justified on basis of agreements 
among members with different interests are discussed in Charles R. Beitz, The idea of 
human rights 73-95 (Oxford University Press. 2009).
9. See Peter Drahos & John Braithwaite, Information feudalism: who owns the 
knowledge economy? 85-107 (New Press. 2003).
10. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 
Legal Instruments - Results of the Uruguay Round, Arts. 22-24, 1869 u.n.t.s. 299, 33 
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any concession related to intellectual property made to one country has to be also 
granted to all other signatory member states. 
Criticism of the new trade regime has been severe and various stakeholder groups 
are searching for alternatives11. The parties aiming for a change are far from being a 
homogeneous mass that shares the same interests and concerns. Disagreement already 
manifests itself in the choice of basic strategy. One group of advocates identifies a 
significant gap between what the trips agreement actually requires countries to 
implement and the level of protection national legislation grants. Taking copyright 
as an example, while trips requires a minimum protection of “no less than 50 years 
from the end of the calendar year of authorized publication”12, common are pro-
tection terms of up to 70 years after the author’s death13. Adjusting national laws 
so that they just meet trips minimal requirements would reduce significantly the 
negative effects of intellectual property. A second group aims at abrogating trips 
altogether, or in a softer variant, to abolish patents in the field of medicine or those 
affecting food security. The third group takes the trips agreement for granted, and 
this either by agreeing that with an addition that compensates some negative effects 
it will be much better than other alternative regimes, or simply, because they believe 
that such a kind of addition is the only improvement attainable. This last group 
aims at building proposals that stand in a positive relation to the trips agreement 
by complementing it with necessary additions. 
Much of the criticism toward the trips agreement and intellectual property 
in general uses the human rights language. There is strong divergence on how 
human rights law is interpreted and on how invasive human rights are on the free 
exercise of intellectual property rights. We will dedicate the next two sections to 
discuss this interaction.
III. on the nature of human rights obligations
The UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights defines three levels 
of obligations: to respect, protect and fulfil. The obligation to respect is seen as 
prohibiting states interfering directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of a parti-
cular human right, while the obligation to protect requires state action when third 
parties are interfering human rights guarantees. Under the obligation to fulfil states 
are required to pursue actions that facilitate, provide and promote human rights14. 
i.l.m. 1197 (2004) [hereinafter trips], art. 4: “With regard to the protection of intel-
lectual property, any advantage, favour, privilege or immunity granted by a Member to 
the nationals of any other country shall be accorded immediately and unconditionally 
to the nationals of all other Members…”.
11. Korthals & Timmermann.
12. trips, art. 12
13. Cf. Charles R. Beitz, The Moral Rights of Creators of Artistic and Literary Works, 
13 Journal of Political Philosophy (2005).
14. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 
14: The right to the highest attainable standard of health (article 12 of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights) (2000).
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Those principles should guide states to implement the different articles of the 
two Covenants in the spirit of the Universal Declaration. Here we should keep 
in mind the genealogy of intellectual property rights. Under human rights law 
the current intellectual property regimes should be seen just as means states have 
made to implement article 15.1 of the icescr15. 
As far as human rights obligations are concerned, the debates on how far states 
have obligations outside their borders will be left aside. Further, it will be taken for 
granted that we can agree on a very minimal welfare threshold line below nobody 
should stand as a matter of human rights. The extent of the debate around suf-
ficientarianism16 makes it clear that an answer on where this line is drawn cannot 
be provided within this context. We should however note that no society can 
secure the objects of human rights absolutely, an attempt to do so would take up 
practically all of society’s resources and still fail to fully guarantee all rights. Society 
can merely hope to sufficiently secure human rights17.
The emphasis will be put on a different discussion. For this article it is more 
interesting to identify the crucial differences between standard human rights viola-
tions and softer interferences in someone’s enjoyment of a human right. Under the 
idea of soft interferences, borderline cases will be focussed on, such as routinely 
discouraging people to make use of freedoms guaranteed by human rights or giv-
ing another party an additional advantage that will completely demotivate people 
to make use of some of their freedoms. Such a type of intervention will however 
have to occur systematically to qualify as a human rights violation18. Single cases, 
interferences from one person to another, do generally not fit this category.
Discouraging scientists to research in areas where infringing patents is almost 
inevitable in order to not be vulnerable to costly lawsuits can be interpreted as limit-
ing scientific freedom. Taking a very broad understanding of the right to take part 
in cultural life (encompassing scientific life) would be at odds with acknowledging 
that some areas of science are already seized. Participation possibilities would be 
restrained for people who are not able to persuade the holder of exclusive rights 
to grant a license. 
15. An official UN comment distinguishes: “Human rights are fundamental as they 
are inherent to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first 
and foremost means by which States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and 
creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as 
the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and 
artistic productions for the benefit of society as a whole”. UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Ben-
efit from the Protection of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, 
Literary or Artistic Production of Which He or She is the Author (Art. 15, Para. 1 (c) of 
the Covenant, E/C.12/GC/17) at [www.unhcr.org/refworld/docid/441543594.html]. §1
16. Cf. Liam Shields, The prospects for sufficientarianism, 24 Utilitas (2012).
17. Cf. Thomas W. Pogge, The international significance of human rights, 4 The Journal 
of Ethics 45 (2000).
18. Phrased in Pogge’s words, human rights violations have to be “in some sense of-
ficial” to count as such, see id. at 47
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More challenging to frame as human rights violations are systematic attempts to 
demotivate the economically poor to participate in science or being actively involved 
in decision-making that determines the role technology should have in their lives. The 
challenge does not merely consist in overinflating the concept of a human rights viola-
tion, but in the subjective nature of what may qualify as a demotivation. That what 
counts as demotivation for some, does not necessarily have the same effects on others. 
There are some natural undeserved advantages that are clearly out of the scope 
of what is covered by human rights law. However, action has to be taken when the 
opportunity to make use of those advantages are not distributed randomly, but 
are concentrated in certain population segments.
Disadvantages are also a result of poverty, e.g. reduced intellectual capacities due 
to malnutrition during childhood. Since addressing those disadvantages entail the 
allocation of limited resources I will not discuss them further here19. Important for 
the main argument is that some disadvantages can be traced to certain technological 
solutions being artificially scarce. As this is a direct effect of intellectual property 
policies design we will dedicate more attention to it in the next sections of this 
article. Here access to scientific literature is probably one of the most prominent 
cases, hindering the possibility to follow up-to-date discussions in cultural life 
(especially science) and politics20.
IV. Catalogue of rights affected by the existing 
intellectual property regimes
Intellectual property affects human rights in multiple ways. To a similar extent, 
commonly held conceptions of justice clash with a reckless use of exclusive rights. 
Criticism of the post-trips intellectual property regimes comes from a wide ar-
ray of stakeholders and affected parties with diverse disciplinary and cultural 
backgrounds representing a broad spectrum of interests. Not surprisingly, the 
language used in the discussion and interpretation of intellectual property regimes 
and alternatives has a corresponding heterogeneity. Further, in discussions around 
the trips agreement, it is difficult to identify who is judging the juridical virtues 
of the trips agreement itself and who is unable (or unwilling) to critically assess 
the wording of the agreement without taking the realities of the world for which 
it was meant into consideration. Extreme inequalities in terms of power, wealth 
and legal expertise have an enormous effect on how an agreement will ultimately 
be implemented. That many liberties foreseen in the trips agreement were signed 
away through bilateral trade agreements is a clear sign of these power plays. 
19. On the normative aspects of fighting poverty, see Paulette Dieterlen, La pobreza: 
un estudio filosófico (Fondo de Cultura Económica, 2003).
20. Online newspapers have greatly facilitated access to current day political discussions 
all around the world. Open access publishing of scientific literature is still relatively rare, 
likewise in the arts, particularly music.
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Additionally, intellectual property regimes are only one of the many factors 
that affect the establishment of an international cooperative environment that 
promotes fruitful scientific enterprises. Labour law, migration control, freedom 
of speech, as well as gender, social or racial discrimination are all elements that 
affect a well-working scientific environment. International law generally takes 
this broader perspective when protecting science as a tool to promote social and 
economic development21.
Consequently, a very broad interpretation of rights will be taken in the following 
to help us understand real and apparent conflicts between the existing regimes, the 
proposed alternatives, commonly held notions of justice and interpretations of human 
rights law. As mentioned, intellectual property regimes and the proposals for reform 
are not only criticized by a variety of private and public actors, but also by advocates 
of different – one could say often competing22 – proposals, which makes it particularly 
important to have as broad an interpretation as possible to understand where real dif-
ferences are present and which conflicts are merely due to misunderstandings. 
A. Benefiting from one’s own intellectual work
Innovators moral and material interests have to be safeguarded according to udhr 
article 27.2. Those private interests however have to be balanced with public inter-
ests and needs23. Intellectual property as currently conceived is not protected as a 
human right24. Human rights law demands from states merely to have a regulatory 
framework that will facilitate innovators the protection of their moral and material 
interests25. Here we have to realize the limitations of existing intellectual property 
law: patent rights allow only some innovators to protect the material interests of 
some of their inventions26. Geographical indications, which can be used to protect 
knowledge that is beyond the scope of patent protection have, as the name states, 
territorial limitations and are limited to collective innovation27. As far as moral 
21. Cf. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (1966), art. 
11.2 (a) and art. 15; Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of States (1974), art. 13 and generally 
Yvonne Donders, The right to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress: in search of the state obligations 
in relation to health, 14 Medicine, Health Care and Philosophy 371 (2011).
22. There is harsh mutual criticism among the advocates of different proposal: for 
Knowledge Ecology International’s review of the Health Impact Fund, cf. [http://keion-
line.org/hif ].
23. trips, Article 7.
24. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, UN Committee on 
Economic, General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protec-
tion of the Moral and Material Interests Resulting from any Scientific, Literary or Artistic 
Production of which he or she is the Author (Art. 15, Para. 1 (c) of the Covenant, E/C.12/
GC/17), especially §§ 1-3, 35.
25. Cf. udhr (1948), art. 27.2 and icescr (1966), art. 15.1(c)
26. Cf. Philippe Cullet, Human rights and intellectual property protection in the trips 
era, 29 Human Rights Quarterly 403 412 (2007). 
27. Cf. Madhavi Sunder, The invention of traditional knowledge, 70 Law and Con-
temporary Problems (2007); Kal Raustiala & Stephen R. Munzer, The Global Struggle 
over Geographic Indications, 18 European Journal of International Law (2007). 
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interests are concerned, intellectual property law only recognizes two moral interests 
as such: attribution of authorship and being able to control the integrity of one’s 
work28. Other interests that are moral in nature, such as concerns about the licens-
ing behaviour of one’s employer over one’s inventions are not legally protected.
For better or worse, much creative intellectual activity still remains beyond 
the scope of what can be protected by patent rights. Some scientific productions 
do not meet the non-obviousness requirement of patentability as they consist in 
a series of small-scale increments. Innovations that are not uniform and stable 
cannot apply for patents or plant varieties protection29. Rediscovery, even when 
assisted by scientific methods, is in principle not patentable. 
Natural law recognizes a right to benefit from intellectual labour. However some 
intellectual labourers are able to gain from intellectual endeavours more than others, 
and this not due to the social utility of their effort nor by having undertaken more 
painstaking work, but merely by their type of work matching better the requirements 
set by the established innovation incentive system. Here we can talk about an unde-
served advantage, which – given that the patent regime is a societal tool to stimulate 
innovation – puts an obligation on society to explain this differential treatment. 
A defence to justify this differential treatment is however missing. At most, we 
can understand the human rights articles that aim at securing basic needs, such as 
food and health care, as dictating a certain preference for one type of innovation 
over other, less urgent ones. The relation between scientific knowledge and social 
utility is indeed addressed in human rights law. In relation to food production, 
icescr article 11.2(a) foresees that “States Parties […] individually and through 
international co-operation […] [shall take measures to] improve methods of pro-
duction, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and 
scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition 
and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the 
most efficient development and utilization of natural resources”. Official UN 
comments on the right to food and the right to health make similar provisions30. 
We are however, as mentioned earlier, far from of having innovation aligned with 
societal needs, especially when taking a wider cosmopolitan conception of justice31.
28. Cf. Carlos Augusto Conde Gutiérrez, Copyrights y derechos morales de autor: la 
experiencia del common law en el Reino Unido, 15 Revista La Propiedad Inmaterial (2011).
29. In agriculture, farmers’ plant varieties, especially those coming from indigenous 
communities are unstable and in permanent evolution, which disqualifies them from 
most types of intellectual property protection, see Olivier De Schutter, The right of 
everyone to enjoy the benefits from scientific progress and the right to food: from conflict to 
complementarity, 33 Human Rights Quarterly 304 317 (2011).
30. Cf. UN Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights General Comment 
12. The right to adequate food (Article 11) (E/C.12/1999/5). (1999). § 26 (on appro-
priate technology), § 36 (international cooperation) and UN Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights General Comment No. 14: The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (Article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights), § 45 (on technical cooperation).
31. Cf. Peter Singer, One world: the ethics of globalization (Yale University Press 2nd 
ed. 2004); Estelle Derclaye, Eudemonic intellectual property: Patents and related rights 
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Similarly, any theory that links ownership to notions of desert would have 
to explain why luck can play such an enormous role in determining the yield of 
harvestable benefits from an invention as is the case with intellectual property32. 
The inventor who brings out the same invention independently a day later is not 
entitled to any benefits33. In general we can say that intellectual property law does 
not recognize effort in any special way. 
The icescr recognizes in article 11.1 a right to the continuous improvement 
of people’s living conditions. There is however no mention that this right ceases 
to be valid once one surpasses a certain threshold level. This right can be seen as a 
liberty that should be respected in itself, regardless of whether or not others are in 
a worse situation. The propensity to improve one’s position, e.g. through science 
and technology development, can be seen as something intrinsic to human nature. 
Yet, whatever claims one might have in being able to improve one’s situation, 
a distinction between full and just remuneration still has to be drawn34. Taxpay-
ers contribute to the establishment of a necessary research infrastructure. Various 
investments in public education and research facilities increase the chances people 
have in taking part in scientific enterprises. Further, inventions rely on previous 
knowledge, the production and conservation thereof having taken place all around 
the world. The fact that all have participated in the production and conservation 
of knowledge, to a greater or lesser extent, precludes that one country could justly 
claim being the full owner of a given piece of knowledge35. Thus, under principles 
of fairness inventors, by having used previous knowledge, owe a certain social 
return to people all around the world36.
Finally, allowing others to benefit from one’s work should not be seen as some-
thing deplorable. As James Wilson rightly notes in relation to innovators: “The 
fact that others can […] benefit from their work need not provide a disincentive 
for them, and if they are even moderately altruistic may provide an incentive”37. 
The non-rivalrous nature of knowledge allows its simultaneous enjoyment by a 
number of people. 
as engines of happiness, peace, and sustainability, 14 Vanderbilt Journal of Entertainment 
and Technology Law (2012). And, for a general overview on philosophical justifications, 
cf. Cristian Timmermann, Limiting and facilitating access to innovations in medicine 
and agriculture: a brief exposition of the ethical arguments, 10: 8 Life Sciences, Society and 
Policy (2014).
32. Cf. Edwin C Hettinger, Justifying intellectual property, 18 Philosophy & Public 
Affairs, 40-43 (1989). 
33. For criticism see Robert Nozick, Anarchy, state, and Utopia 182 (Blackwell, 1974). 
34. Cf. Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests in a Human Rights 
Framework, 40 University of California Davis Law Review 1039 1129 (2007).
35. A well known example is knowledge related to plant breeding, cf. Jack Kloppen-
burg & Daniel Lee Kleinman, The Plant Germplasm Controversy, 37 BioScience (1987).
36. Herbert Simon estimates that social capital produces at least 90% of the income 
in richer societies like the United States or North-Western Europe. On moral ground a 
social return may match this rate, cf. Herbert A. Simon, UBI and the Flat Tax, in What’s 
Wrong with a Free Lunch? (Philippe van Parijs et al., eds., 2001).
37. James Wilson, Ontology and the regulation of intellectual property, 93 The Monist 
450 455 (2010). 
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B. Benefiting from scientific advancement
The advancement of science brings about a series of innovations from which human-
kind may benefit. Science however follows research agendas and incentives that 
have been more or less deliberately set38. The objects made newly available are 
partially determined by the direction science takes. We can however change this 
direction; some would even argue that we are obliged to do so in order to benefit 
people who are in direr needs39. Therefore, benefiting from scientific advancement 
can be understood as not only meaning access to the objects that science brings 
out, but also a fairer allocation of research efforts.
Moral (or in some cases legal) obligations to make objects of innovation avail-
able are determined by three main factors: uniqueness of the object, dependency 
upon it and on how urgently access is needed. 
Uniqueness of objects. An object may be considered unique if there are natural 
or semantic constraints that impede the provision of an alternative. From a less 
strict perspective, an object may also be considered unique if reasonable efforts will 
not produce an alternative within the time the object of innovation is protected 
by exclusive rights. Lastly, a broader concept of “unique” will consider an object 
of innovation as unique if at present no alternative products exist. 
In the first case availability of the object of innovation will depend mostly on 
the licensing behaviour of the holder of exclusive rights. Here responsible behaviour 
can be demanded, as the patentee is in control of the single existing solution. This 
responsibility diminishes the more alternatives are available or would become 
available if action was taken. The more alternatives are feasible, the more the re-
sponsibility is shared with civil society, which could also have engaged in similar 
endeavours to come up with solutions. 
Dependency. An additional criterion is to analyse how dependent the fulfil-
ment of a human right is on the availability of the object of innovation. Are there 
alternative ways to fulfil the human right in question other than using the object 
of innovation? Can we reach the same goal through other means? Mostly this is the 
case. Even in the instance of health we can question whether medicines are the sole 
conduit to better health. With preventive measures, especially through improve-
ments of sanitary infrastructures, we can often avoid having to rely on medicines. 
A common objection to this reasoning is to say that we are dependent on the 
object of innovation given the circumstances in which we find ourselves. The 
38. Cf. Paula E. Stephan, How economics shapes science (Harvard University Press, 
2012); Bruce Macfarlane & Ming Cheng, Communism, Universalism and Disinterested-
ness: Re-examining Contemporary Support among Academics for Merton’s Scientific Norms, 
6 Journal of Academic Ethics (2008).
39. Generally, utilitarians would mostly take such a standpoint, e.g. for this type of 
argumentation see Peter Singer, Practical Ethics 218-246 (Cambridge University Press, 
2nd ed., 1993). 
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horrible state of deprivation in which a third of the world population lives makes 
us dependent on remedies and fixes. 
Urgency. While temporary for society as a whole, exclusive rights are often per-
manently exclusive for single individuals. In the case of medicines, late access can 
mean death, injury or inefficacy. Less dramatic cases involve situations where an 
invention could considerably improve people’s lives. We may think of innovation 
in water procurement methods that will make the carrying of water supplies over 
long distances redundant. This would increase the quality of life of women who 
are disproportionally burdened with this task. The need/want distinction is much 
more difficult to maintain than might appear at first sight, especially when there 
is no agreement on minimum welfare standards citizens are entitled to.
Besides asserting claims on the objects of innovation themselves, a fairer distri-
bution in the targets of research efforts can be argued for. A possible interpretation 
of the right to benefit from the advancement of science amounts to an entitle-
ment to a share of global research efforts. We are far from such a fair distribution. 
Prominent in the intellectual property and global justice debate is the so-called 
10/90 gap in pharmaceutical research40 (other areas show similar inequalities)41. 
Herewith the deplorable situation where 90% of global health resources are spent 
to address the problems of 10% of the world’s population is called to attention. 
Implicit in this criticism is that there is such thing as a fair share of research time 
to be distributed globally. This can be interpreted to entail that the amount of 
dedication to a particular problem should be proportional to its urgency – a par-
ticular welfare issue has to be measured in number of people affected and intensity 
of the suffering or disadvantage involved. Allocation of research efforts has to be 
distributed accordingly. Another possible interpretation is to say that everyone is 
entitled to having a vote on which targets research should be aimed at. Related to 
this is the general question on how much has to be spent on science and technol-
ogy development altogether. 
A general disagreement emerges when we ask ourselves in how far do people not 
only have a claim on what science provides but also in what science could plausibly 
provide for if research agendas and resources where directed to meet such targets. 
An additional factor that has to be brought to attention is that the exclusiv-
ity granted by intellectual property rights not only serves to recoup research and 
development costs, but also advertisement expenses. This calls the general cost-
effectiveness of intellectual property rights as a method to incentivize innovation 
into question. Money spent on marketing may pay better off than money spent on 
further innovation. It has been claimed that pharmaceutical companies are spending 
40. Cf. Drugs for Neglected Diseases Working Group and Timmermann & Belt, 
Intellectual Property and Global Health.
41. Research in tropical agriculture has been similarly neglected, see Seed policies 
and the right to food: enhancing agrobiodiversity and encouraging innovation (Report 
presented to the UN General Assembly, 64th session, UN doc. A/64/170). § 34.
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twice as much on marketing and administration as on research and development42. 
To these inefficiencies we have to add patent application, maintenance and litiga-
tion costs – all costs that reduce the budget of actual innovation43. 
The use of research monies for non-scientific purposes can with good reason be 
condemned, especially keeping the urgent need for pro-poor innovation in mind, 
which demands a more efficient use of resources.
C. participation
The most prominent readings of udhr article 27 tend to ignore the participation 
in science component. However, especially the unesco has been eagerly promot-
ing active participation possibilities44. Intellectual property rights affect scientific 
participation in multiple dimensions: 
Openness. Intellectual property regimes may hinder openness in direct and 
indirect ways. Trade secret laws limit the freedom many scientists employed in 
industry have to discuss current findings, often even after employment ends. Pat-
ent requirements demand that knowledge on an invention has not been publicly 
disclosed prior to filing for exclusive rights, thus promoting a scientific culture 
that evades early disclosure of research results. Copyright laws allow also a pub-
lishing behaviour that is enormously restrictive in permitting access to literature 
and supporting datasets. 
Lack of openness impedes the possibility to give feedback; this applies to input 
that serves self-interest as well as that which is altruistically motivated45. 
Relevance of state-of-the-art. The advantage break-through science has over achieve-
ments made by incremental improvements has been criticized46. Here we have to dis-
tinguish between deserved advantages and benefits gained by external circumstances. 
It might be acceptable that people suffer some disadvantages from being antiquated 
or because they refuse to use new techniques, but suffering the full range of handicaps 
for not being able to adjust to new trends seems too hard a penalty. As a further factor, 
one has to keep in mind that people who continue autochthonous practices conserve 
tacit knowledge and are vital to recover past know-how. Practising traditional medicine 
and partaking in seed exchange programs play an important role for the conservation 
of biodiversity. Society as a whole benefits from such undertakings.
42. See Marcia Angell, Excess in the pharmaceutical industry, 171 Canadian Medical 
Association Journal 1451 1452 (2004).
43. Cf. Joseph E. Stiglitz, Economic Foundations of Intellectual Property Rights, 57 
Duke Law Journal 1693 (2008).
44. unesco, The Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications 
(unesco 2009), and Cristian Timmermann, Sharing in or benefiting from scientific ad-
vancement?, 20 Science and Engineering Ethics (2014).
45. On alternative feedback models, cf. David Koepsell, Back to basics: how technology 
and the open source movement can save science, 24 Social Epistemology (2010).
46. See Paul B. Thompson, Is Our Agricultural Technology Innovation System Up to 
21st Century Challenges?, 24 Science Progress (2010), for agricultural innovation.
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Intellectual property gives researchers who are able to match the novelty require-
ment of patentability a considerable advantage by giving them the opportunity to 
recoup reasonable research and development costs. And, as mentioned before, intel-
lectual property rights make it also possible to recoup costs of extensive marketing 
campaigns that further increase sales. Those who cannot match this requirement 
are facing multiple disadvantages.
Malleability. Increasingly holders of exclusive rights dictate the conditions 
under which the object of innovation can be used or modified. This has created so 
much outrage in the software community that it helped to nurture the open source 
movement, which aims at restoring past freedoms. The effects those constraints 
have on scientific participation are multiple. Setting specific terms under which 
people are allowed to contribute may limit both the number of opportunities to 
contribute and the number of potential contributors. Some innovators may also 
be deterred to contribute since the format their input has to be in does not suit 
their personal needs. Others may simply refuse to cooperate once the terms are 
unattractive or deemed unacceptable. 
A restriction on modification possibilities limits the users’ control of the object 
(so that they are not able to change and modify it as they see fit) – while such 
control is something that is intrinsically valued. There is a widespread interest 
to own an object (as a piece of property), not merely lease it. Article 17 of the 
Universal Declaration of Human Right identifies the right to own property as a 
fundamental human right47. Liberties that are traditionally associated with property 
rights include the ability to modify or even destroy48 an item, a liberty progressively 
undermined by licensing developments in the music, movie and software industry. 
Exclusive rights on industrial seed varieties expand this trend by limiting traditional 
farming practices such as the replanting of seeds from past harvests, informal seed 
exchanges and further attempts to improve these varieties49.
Diversity of input possibilities. Inaccessibility of information is one of the many 
barriers the poor face when they want to cooperate in existing scientific endeav-
ours. The digital divide and language barriers are still strong obstacles. More than 
natural language, technical jargons amount to a significant barrier. Patent docu-
ments have to be drafted in a specific scientific-legal language that increasingly 
only a few legal experts master. Contributions to science also have to be made 
using a specific language.
47. A right to own property has also wide support in philosophical quarters; e.g. people 
are entitled to hold property (land and movable goods) under Martha Nussbaum’s cent-
ral human capabilities list, cf. Martha C. Nussbaum, Creating capabilities 34 (Harvard 
University Press, 2011). 
48. Cf. Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, The right to destroy, 114 The Yale Law Journal 781 
(2005).
49. Cf. Niels Louwaars, Seeds of confusion: the impact of policies on seed systems (PhD 
thesis, Wageningen Universiteit, 2007); Jack Kloppenburg, Re-purposing the master’s tools: 
The open source seed initiative and the struggle for seed sovereignty, Journal of Peasant Studies.
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Patent offices only accept patent documents that are drafted in specified natural 
and technical languages. Some advocates of freedom of speech would go so far as to 
consider this a method to limit the freedom to express oneself. Having such types of 
requirements are commonplace in the social and natural sciences. Certain standard-
izations facilitate the exchange of information between a wide array of stakeholders 
and individuals. What becomes harder to defend however is when particular groups 
of society are routinely hindered to partake in a dialogue because they lack the abil-
ity to communicate in the required language. This is the more unacceptable, when 
some of the remaining partners in the dialogue benefit from this lack of inclusion. 
Reciprocity. Willingness to share and participate in certain endeavours is often 
affected by the perceived justness of a system. A successful cooperative enterprise 
demands that all partners are deemed worthy to cooperate with. Perceived unfair-
ness or misconduct in the past have to be addressed before it is possible to regain 
widely shared enthusiasm for cooperation50. Exclusive rights by nature leave many 
individuals without the benefits of science, something that is difficult to assimilate 
with certain intuitions of justice, as the wide global public support to access to 
essential medicines clearly exemplifie51. The non-rivalrous consumption of intel-
lectual goods makes artificial scarcity objectionable.
d. Self-determination
Related to the issue of participation is the right to self-determination, a right that 
plays a central role in human rights law. The two Covenants (1966) concede a right 
to self-determination to peoples in their first articles. It is alleged that opening up 
participation possibilities for scientific enterprises will foster more democratic deci-
sions for research agendas52. In principle, democratic decision-making for setting 
research agendas requires only a minimum scientific education and not necessarily 
active participation at the most advanced levels of research. Provided this is true, 
efforts to enable people to have a say in research agendas would not have to be 
linked to advocating more inclusive scientific research endeavours. Transparency 
in science and technology development would suffice. 
Self-determination would however demand some type of decision-making 
mechanism that includes votes of people from all social and geographic segments. 
As mentioned earlier, research agendas are nowadays primarily shaped by market 
incentives – in a world with such huge inequalities a highly undemocratic system. 
Further, some research that looks promising is often abandoned once research 
managers realize that exclusive rights cannot be obtained and this despite potential 
50. Cf. Gorik Ooms, Why the West is perceived as being unworthy of cooperation, 38 
Journal of Law, Medicine and Ethics 594 (2010).
51. Cf. Amy Kapczynski, The Access to Knowledge Mobilization and the New Politics 
of Intellectual Property, 117 Yale Law Journal 804 (2008).
52. Farida Shaheed, Report of the Special Rapporteur in the field of cultural rights 
(United Nations (A/HRC/20/26) 2012).
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social benefits or utility53. Research institutes and private companies are continu-
ously pushed toward delivering saleable patentable products; social utility and 
scientific freedom are rapidly relegated toward a secondary plane. 
Research spending per capita differs strongly among countries54. Discrepan-
cies in research spending are defensible if contribution rates are set according to 
capacity to pay (discounting maybe special needs). However when countries in a 
similar position differ so drastically in the budget they allocate for research and 
development, giving citizens from different countries the same weighting of their 
votes becomes hard to justify on principles of fairness. 
V. Strengths and weaknesses of the different proposals
There is widespread agreement that current intellectual property regimes collide 
with ideas of justice and human rights on a wide range of issues. Unfortunately, 
beyond this shared conviction, there is little the different stakeholder groups are 
unanimous about. There is no conceptualized ideal solution that could serve as a 
yardstick from which to measure deviations. We can only hypothesize on how a 
world with a different incentive system would work. 
However, among the different groups that have drafted the alternative pro-
posals to be discussed below, an additional commonality can be found. There is 
a certain consensus that we live in a world of extreme inequalities dominated by 
very powerful players to which some concessions have to be made. None of the 
depicted proposals can be considered completely utopian and unaware of current 
realities. The extent however to which these limitations are taken as intransigent, 
varies strongly among the different proponents. 
Proposals to alleviate the negative effects of exclusive rights do generally not aim 
at tackling all the problems raised by the IP regime and existing global inequalities. 
Instead, we have a wide spectrum of solutions, some with very modest targets, 
others being only satisfied with a complete changeover. The aims of the proposals 
differ according to what advocates recognize as problems and the level of urgency 
that they assign to them. Addressing political feasibility, advocates grant conces-
sions to make the various proposals more attractive to governments and industry.
A further problem ensues from the circumstance that the discussion on what 
is feasible and what is not is highly polarized. This is due to the ambiguity of 
the concept of “feasibility” and its wide applicability. It allows to rule out certain 
proposals that cannot be implemented in practice, but also facilitates comparative 
assessment55. In how far we are willing to classify something as feasible or not, 
depends in part on what we consider an undeniable characteristic of political reality 
53. David Lea, The expansion and restructuring of intellectual property and its implica-
tions for the developing world, 11 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 37 46 (2008). 
54. Cf. Global Investment in R&D. uis Fact Sheet (uis/FS/2012/22). (2012). 
55. Cf. Pablo Gilabert & Holly Lawford-Smith, Political feasibility: A conceptual 
exploration, 60 Political Studies 809 (2012).
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or essential to human nature. Since notions thereof are subjective, disagreements 
on what is feasible are inevitable. 
The room for disagreement is further expanded, if we consider that many 
proposals are feasible only if one expands one’s room for future capabilities by 
undertaking specific political strategies56. As this demands long-term discipline, 
differences of opinion increase further. Long-term commitments do not only fail 
because of lack of discipline, but also due to disputes on how far we can bind 
future freedoms to present-day decisions. There are strong disagreements on the 
question if we are entitled to limit the freedom of those who are not present while 
we decide on future agendas57. Complexity is added in questions around climate 
change or pollution control, since lack of action today amounts to constrained 
room for action in the future. As a society we are accountable for both not having 
taken precautionary measures and bad planning.
To gain an oversight of the different solutions supported by various stakeholder 
groups, six major proposals with their strengths and weaknesses will be sketched. 
I will briefly note how these proposals relate to the four conflicting human rights 
discussed earlier: the right to benefit from one’s own intellectual work, the right 
to benefit from science, the right to participate in the advancement of science, 
and the right to self-determination.
A. Health Impact Fund
The idea behind the Health Impact Fund (hif ) is to gather a large sum of money 
to compensate developers of new medicines according to their capacity to increase 
quality-adjusted life years (qalys)58. Companies or institutions that develop new 
medicines and provide them at cost price may opt for the Fund’s reward. Partici-
pating in the Fund is voluntary, although opting out is only possible after a certain 
time elapses. Patent holders are not required to give up their patents, thus retaining 
a certain control over follow-up innovation59.
The Health Impact Fund is designed to secure access to medicines. While later 
amendments make it possible to receive Fund’s rewards by proving the efficacy and 
adequate use of traditional herbal medicines60, the Fund has been drafted with the 
main purpose of promoting health with Western-style pharmaceutical medicines. 
Based on the principles behind the Health Impact Fund, other types of funds 
56. Pablo Gilabert, The feasibility of basic socioeconomic human rights: A conceptual 
exploration, 59 The Philosophical Quarterly 659 (2009); Holly Lawford-Smith, Under-
standing Political Feasibility, Journal of Political Philosophy (2012).
57. Cf. Axel Gosseries & Lukas H. Meyer, Intergenerational justice (Oxford Uni-
versity Press 2009).
58. Aidan Hollis & Thomas W. Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New 
Medicines Accessible for All 18-20 (Incentives for Global Health 2008). 
59. Id. at 22.
60. Joy Mendel & Aidan Hollis, The Health Impact Fund and traditional medicines, igh 
Discussion Paper No. 8 at [http://healthimpactfund.org/files/DP8_Mendel_and_Hollis.pdf ].
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have been suggested to propagate climate-friendly technologies61. A similar fund 
to foster pro-poor agricultural innovation is also conceivable. 
The hif asks from innovators to pass a certain hurdle (among other conditions) 
to be able to claim the Fund’s rewards – in the case of medicines the market approval 
by a major biosafety regulation agency like the US Food and Drug Administration 
(fda)62. The cost-effective measurement of qalys requires standardization and 
minimum variations in efficacy between medicines of different manufacturers, 
making industrial mass production mandatory63.
The rewarding and financing mechanism of the hif can only work if the 
system is transparent. However, exactly this has great potential in attracting the 
involvement of a wide array of research consortia, since transparency of capital 
inflow will increase trust among the different partners. We can also imagine that 
with an operative hif companies will emerge that will focus solely on carrying out 
clinical trials for established consortia. Open innovation models that work with 
licenses that oblige their users to make modifications to the objects taken from 
the commons available to research partners could secure future funds by applying 
for the hif rewards with their inventions64.
The Health Impact Fund aims at making the benefits of scientific advancement 
more broadly accessible. It also works towards a fairer allocation of research effort 
in order to make medicines for neglected diseases available. The profitability of 
intellectual work in pharmaceutical research is maintained. 
Criticism. Countries where neglected diseases are most prevalent will have 
direct access to pathogens, local knowledge on how the disease is propagated, and 
contact with affected populations. Advantages gained by this forerunner position 
might be easily lost when we consider the vast superiority of laboratories belonging 
to established pharmaceutical companies or their research partners. No guarantees 
are given to increase the participation of researchers from poorer countries65. The 
proposal is like the current patent regime a winner-takes-all system, thus leaving 
any creative worker that was somewhat behind empty-handed.
61. Cristian Timmermann & Henk van den Belt, Global justice considerations for 
a proposed “Climate Impact Fund”, 4 Public Reason 182 (2012); Cristian Timmermann 
& Henk van den Belt, Climate change, intellectual property rights and global justice, in 
Climate Change and Sustainable Development: Ethical Perspectives on Land Use and Food 
Production (Thomas potthast & Simon meisch, eds., 2012), and Thomas W. Pogge, 
Keynote Address: Poverty, Climate Change, and Overpopulation, 38 Georgia Journal of In-
ternational and Comparative Law 525 (2010).
62. Aidan Hollis & Thomas W. Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New 
Medicines Accessible for All. Supplements and Corrections at [www.yale.edu/macmillan/
igh/files/HIF_supplementsNov09.pdf ].
63. The negative effects of this measure are described in Timmermann & Belt, Climate 
Impact Fund.
64. Cf. Cristian Timmermann, The Health Impact Fund and the right to participate 
in the advancement of science, European Journal of Applied Ethics 1(1) (2012).
65. Timmermann & Belt, Climate Impact Fund.
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Democratic decision-making on which research paths should be developed 
remains unaddressed. Thus little is done to improve people’s right to self-deter-
mination. 
The huge sum needed to set up the Health Impact Fund is seen as an impedi-
ment. Kathleen liddell compares the 6 billion dollars annually needed to set up 
the Health Impact Fund with the total United Nations operating budget, which 
is approximately 30% less than what the fund needs and recalls the problems the 
United Nations faces to make countries pay their contributions66.
B. prize systems and advanced market commitments
In certain ways the Health Impact Fund can also be identified as a prize system, but 
there are other prize systems that have a completely different type of architecture. 
Some prize systems work with pre-identified targets, incentivizing companies to 
develop products with certain characteristics and functions. Advanced market 
commitments are one example of such type of prize systems and have already 
been put into practice for the development of some vaccines67. The idea behind 
advanced market commitments is that a central agency commits itself in advance 
to buy a certain number of end-products that meet predefined characteristics. 
Another alternative is to stop providing patent protection for clearly specified 
research areas that are vital to secure human rights. The incentive to engage in 
research and development would be created by direct government funding. This 
strategy has been suggested for vital medicines68. A range of targets is identified 
and rewards set according to urgency and estimated development costs. 
Generally prize systems aim to make the benefits of scientific advancement 
accessible and to orient science toward making solutions for wider societal prob-
lems available, while recognizing that innovators should be fairly remunerated. 
Prize systems have the potential to increase the self-determination of people. The 
characteristics and functions an invention should have can in principle be decided 
democratically. 
Prize systems can be designed to reward second- or third-ranked options, al-
leviating the problem of a winner-takes-all system.
Criticism. Having predefined targets comes with the cost that there is little incen-
tive in developing a product that surpasses the minimum characteristics specified69. 
66. Kathleen Liddell, The Health Impact Fund: a critique, in Incentives for Global 
Public Health. Patent Law and Access to Essential Medicines 161 f. (Thomas W. pogge 
et al., eds., 2010).
67. For a critical note cf. Anne-Emanuelle Birn & Joel Lexchin, Beyond patents: The 
GAVI Alliance, AMCs and improving immunization coverage through public sector vaccine 
production in the global south, 7 Human Vaccines 291 (2011).
68. Cf. James Love & Tim Hubbard, The Big Idea: Prizes to Stimulate R&D for New 
Medicines, 82 Chicago-Kent Law Review 1519 (2007).
69. Cf. Thomas W. Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Enhancing Justice and Efficiency 
in Global Health, 13 Journal of Human Development and Capabilities 537 549 (2012). 
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The agency specifying the requirements that the object of innovation must meet 
has to have a fairly good knowledge of what it can reasonably expect, thus making 
good estimates only feasible when the potential product is already in a later stage 
of development. Potential products whose research has been vastly neglected would 
be bad candidates for such a system70. The modularity of the different prize systems 
makes it also easy for governments and funding agencies to cancel individual pe-
riodical prize contests without evoking the resistance of large stakeholders groups.
Prize systems do not actively encourage wider scientific participation, except 
when addressed to specific groups (e.g. young scholars’ awards, municipal prizes). 
C. open innovation models 
Open innovation does not consist in a single clearly defined proposal, a number of 
innovation models fall under this category. Here the concept will be used in an even 
broader manner by also including ideals prevalent in the open access and open source 
movement. As central to this trend we can identify the availability of at least one 
“kernel” that is openly accessible and works as a starting point for further innovation. 
The central aim is to facilitate outside contribution possibilities71. Following this 
basic principle, the “open-movement” can be ramified into different sub-movements. 
One sub-movement is the open access initiative. A series of public institutions, think 
tanks and ngos have committed themselves to increase the number of freely available 
publications72. Not only the outrage triggered by rising journal subscription prices, 
but also an increasing acknowledgement that information should be accessible to all 
without discrimination, has made this movement increasingly popular. Two inventions 
have boosted the potential of this movement. One is technical – the Internet and its 
immense potential to make huge amounts of information accessible and identifiable. 
The second invention is of a legal nature, and consists in a wide array of newly devel-
oped licenses, as illustrated, for example, by the Creative Commons models. Those 
licenses allow authors to retain only the legally entitled rights they want to make use of73.
A diversity of opinions can be found regarding which rights one should be 
allowed to keep. Some groups allow all but commercial use, others don’t reserve 
any rights at all. Similarly with the integrity of the creative work, opinions change 
in how far one may freely alter a created object. In how far one wants to have the 
70. Criticism based on the case of medicines is offered by Hollis & Pogge, The 
Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for All 106 f. 
71. On the benefits of openness in general, cf. Yochai Benkler, Coase’s Penguin, or, 
Linux and The Nature of the Firm, 112 The Yale Law Journal 369 (2002).
72. Cf. Budapest Open Access Initiative, February 2002, Bethesda Statement on Open 
Access Publishing, June 2003, and the Berlin Declaration on Open Access to Knowledge 
in the Sciences and Humanities, October 2003, cf. Manon A. Ress, Open-Access Publish-
ing: From Principles to practice, in Access to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property 
(Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski, eds., 2010).
73. E.g. for educational materials, cf. Javiera Atenas et al., Opening teaching land-
scapes: The importance of quality assurance in the delivery of open educational resources, 6 
Open Praxis (2014).
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created object attributed to one’s authorship is also an issue where opinions diverge. 
The movement has increased its outreach by making templates of different 
licenses publicly available74. Tutorials have made those licenses accessible for those 
who are not legally literate75. 
The second sub-movement is the open source movement. Again, here a standard 
charter does not exist and we can identify great variations of this movement. We 
may say that this movement was sparked by people who are interested in inventing 
or in problem-solving more generally, and do not want to be limited by intellectual 
property restrictions. Distinctive is that many advocates of this movement tend to 
refer to it as a restoration of past standards and not so much as a revolution76. Not 
only a balance between private and public interests is aimed at, but also a balance 
between interests of initial and follow-on innovators is sought for77. Open source 
models are especially keen in securing malleability of research outputs.
The architecture of open source projects permits the creation of new sub- or 
parallel workgroups. A project leader who does not fulfil the expectations of 
collaborators runs the risk of losing contributors to side-projects that do match 
common interests. Success of any project is dependent upon each project leader’s 
capacity to attract collaborators78. 
Somewhat different than in other movements, many open source collabora-
tors identify themselves as part of a community. In how far users are expected 
to reciprocate by also sharing their contribution is something each open source 
platform decides on its own (either democratically or unilaterally). Some com-
munities have developed policies that make the sharing of improvements to the 
community mandatory. This however generally counts only for improvements 
that have been made public. There are no duties to share improvements made 
for personal use only. Thus while aiming at certain standards of reciprocity, open 
source communities do not go as far as aspiring to fully share any improvement 
that came into existence. 
In how far inputs are rewarded or not, depends on the research entities, thus 
limiting to a certain extent the possibilities to materially benefit from one’s work. 
 In sum, the open innovation enthusiasm is chiefly about enabling participa-
tion. It is hoped that wider participation will also make the necessary innovation 
available, and a greater number of participants also increases the democratic 
legitimacy of innovation systems. 
74. Cf. [http://creativecommons.org/].
75. Ibid.
76. Cf. Guido Nicolosi & Guido Ruivenkamp, Re-skilling the Social Practices: Open 
Source and Life - Towards a Commons-Based Peer Production in Agro-biotechnology?, Sci-
ence and engineering ethics (2012), or in terms of repossession cf. Jack Kloppenburg, 
Impeding dispossession, enabling repossession: Biological open source and the recovery of seed 
sovereignity, 10 Journal of Agrarian Change 367 (2010).
77. Cf. Janet Hope, Open Source Genetics: A Conceptual Framework, in Gene patents 
and collaborative licensing models 171 (Geertrui van overwalle, ed., 2009). 
78. Ibid. at 181.
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Criticism. Extreme inequality demands a system that delivers the products of 
innovation to the most needy. Open innovation could lead to technical solutions 
that are only apt for the technologically skilled. Open innovation advocates mainly 
freedom for research and development. The type of outcomes plays a secondary 
role; the emphasis is put on there being an outcome. Naturally, most innovators 
will tend to develop solutions for problems they encounter. However, those who 
have the liberty to innovate are most likely not the worst-off and also encounter a 
different set of problems. An active engagement with the problems of the poor will 
still have to be separately incentivized. Similarly, openness alone is not enough to 
allow the very poor to participate in science. Without access to basic infrastructure 
and education most people will not be able to participate.
The flexibility innovators have to move further to other projects comes at the 
price that additional incentives will be needed to maintain interest in finishing 
tedious long-term projects. This will require further resources, something that 
open innovation models in general have little capacity to sufficiently generate. 
The issue of accessibility remains insufficiently addressed. Not having to pay 
for expensive licenses will certainly reduce the price of the objects of innovation, 
however extreme poverty also demands that those objects are cheaply reproducible, 
which however has to be incentivized through other means.
d. South-South partnerships
Establishing networks that connect innovative capacities amid different regions of 
the Global South is another initiative to alleviate the negative effects of the current 
intellectual property regime. People who live in similar environmental conditions 
share many of the same problems and often the same spare resources. Therefore, it 
seems natural that people who have been cognitively stimulated by comparable sets 
of problems have a great potential to learn from one another. Further, it has been 
noted that some people are so poor that they can only benefit from technological 
innovations if these can be reconstructed using spare local resources79. 
One of the networks that aim at making grassroots innovators’ knowledge more 
widely known and recognized is the Honeybee Network in India80. Much can be 
learned from a network that has shown great success in a country with such enormous 
cultural diversity within its borders and amounting to a sixth of the global population. 
The Honeybee Network is far from representing a negative attitude towards Western 
technology. It primarily encourages local innovators to participate in technological 
innovation to offer alternatives. But the same goes for the use of local technologies; 
79. Cf. Anil K. Gupta, Grassroots Green Innovations for Inclusive, Sustainable Develop-
ment, in The Innovation for Development Report 2009-2010, Strengthening Innovation for 
the Prosperity of the Nations (Augusto lopez-Claros ed. 2010).
80. Anil K. Gupta, From sink to source: the Honey Bee Network documents indigenous 
knowledge and innovations in India, (summer) Innovations 46 (2006).
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it invites industry and farmers to become acquainted with local innovation. It does 
however recognize the vulnerability of grassroots innovators when it comes to protect-
ing their knowledge. Here legal counselling is offered to help indigenous innovators 
secure their material and moral interest81. While making sure that innovators receive 
their share in any monetary benefits raised by their intellectual creation, the Network 
also focuses on securing the moral interest of innovators. Names, pictures and origin 
are information often shared if the inventor so wishes. And this also in cases where 
little or no material benefits can be expected. We can identify a particular ideal in this 
initiative: the recognition and promotion of local expertise. To honour this ideal a variety 
of outreach endeavours have been started, including computerized networked kiosks 
that allow inhabitants of rural areas to browse for innovations in multiple languages 
and an extensive radio and television coverage of local innovation82. 
This type of initiative seeks to make available solutions for people who are in 
similar conditions as the inventors. The chances that such innovations become 
accessible to those in need are thus far greater. Since the inventor/user divide is 
small or non-existent, innovations are more focused on people’s urgent needs. 
Inventions for everyday matters that do not attract much attention by the inter-
national scientific community, like improvements in sanitation systems, are more 
likely to be developed. 
South-South partnerships aim at empowering people who are currently un-
derrepresented in the scientific community to be able to participate in scientific 
enterprises. Wider participation increases the chances that voices of now excluded 
people are heard. 
Criticism. On moral grounds, there is little one can criticize about this type of 
initiative. Coexistence in harmony is aimed at, something that is a laudable goal, 
but this demands from victims of past injustices to move on often without having 
their disputes settled. 
Given the huge inequalities among rich and poor one might wonder if such 
networks will have sufficient power to rebalance losses suffered with the imple-
mentation of the trips agreement. Especially innovations that demand a high 
level of expertise have still to find sufficient financial backers in the developing 
world. Except in the brics countries83, big science projects will still have to rely 
on a significant help from developed countries or resort to an alliance of a large 
group of developing countries. Large differences within the countries make such 
type of collaborations unlikely in the near future.
E. Access to knowledge (A2K) movement 
It will not come as a surprise that the central issue around the Access to Knowledge 
81. Ibid. at 57.
82. Ibid. at 60.
83. Ibid. Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa.
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movement is to make knowledge accessible to people. The demand is to make 
knowledge more accessible for the fostering of scientific and cultural life. Currently, 
there are no obligations for copyright holders to make a publication available once 
it becomes out-of-print. The consequence is that the majority of works protected by 
copyright are insufficiently accessible. Archivists, educational institutions and libraries 
should have the liberty to make copies available when works are not commercially 
exploited84. The possibility to change protected content in order for it to be acces-
sible for people with certain disabilities is also an issue the movement advocates85.
Patent documents may not include all necessary information to reproduce an 
invention86. Commitment to transfer know-how should be a prerequisite for the 
granting of a patent87. A general concern to make tacit knowledge available can 
also be identified in the draft treaty of the movement. 
In the A2K agenda, we can find some elements that have to do less with access 
to knowledge directly, but more with justice in general. Patents can only be granted 
if the source or origin of biological material utilized is disclosed88. Here we can 
recognize an attempt to limit biopiracy – a policy in favour of securing indigenous 
communities’ moral and material interests89. Similarly measures to make publicly 
funded research, data and broadcasting accessible are specified. When applying for 
patents, inventors must disclose if they benefited from governmental funding90. 
Access to governmental information is also justified as an issue of transparency91.
The movement also recognizes that the public domain is something that is in 
need of protection92. Ever more knowledge qualifies as protectable by exclusive rights 
and temporary exclusivity also becomes lengthier. Broadening exclusive rights can 
limit future innovation. Creative authors need materials on which to draw for further 
innovation. If the so-called “building blocks” of further innovation are privatized, 
access cannot be guaranteed. Recognizing that inventions do not come out of the 
void, efforts to actively expand knowledge commons have to be undertaken93. 
84. Treaty on Access to Knowledge (draft 9 May 2005) (hereinafter A2K treaty (draft)) 
available at [www.cptech.org/a2k/a2k_treaty_may9.pdf ], art. 3.1 viii and for orphan 
works generally art. 3.8.
85. A2K treaty (draft), art. 3.3.
86. The trips Agreement art. 29.1 demands that the patent document should contain 
all information needed for somebody skilled in the art to reproduce the invention. This 
however is often not done precisely.
87. A2K treaty (draft), art. 4.1 (c) iv. 
88. A2K treaty (draft), art. 4.1 (c) ii.
89. For the legal status of traditional knowledge in international law, cf. Carlos M. 
Correa, Access to Knowledge: The Case of Indigenous and Traditional Knowledge, in Access 
to Knowledge in the Age of Intellectual Property (Gaëlle Krikorian & Amy Kapczynski, 
eds., 2010), and Protecting traditional knowledge: pathways to the future (2006).
90. A2K treaty (draft), art. 4.1 (c) iii.
91. A2K treaty (draft), art. 5.5.
92. For a general defence, cf. also James Boyle, The public domain. Enclosing the com-
mons of the mind (Yale University Press, 2008).
93. A2K treaty (draft), art. 5.1. The importance of maintaining a commons from 
which everybody can draw for further innovation has also been ascertained for plant 
breeding by supporting easier access to genetic resources, cf. De Schutter, The right 
of everyone to enjoy the benefits from scientific progress and the right to food: From conflict 
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Additionally, the A2K movement recognizes that intellectual property rights can 
be abused and demands clarity about which licensing practices qualify as such94. 
The idea of abuse of rights is also present in the trips agreement95.
In relation to the above-discussed threatened human rights, the Access to 
Knowledge movement seeks to address all four rights. The benefits of science 
should be accessible to all and people are to be equipped with the tools to partici-
pate in the advancement of science. It tackles the issue of self-determination by 
seeking more transparency and empowering more people with a right to access 
to information. Some constraints are however set on how far people may exploit 
their creative work. A stricter balance between society’s interests and the interests 
of innovators is sought. Additionally, it plans measures to avoid illicit exploitation 
of other peoples’ inventions, especially by addressing the issue of biopiracy. 
Criticism. The A2K movement is a very ambitious movement, often un-
derestimating current political realities. The urgency to include more people in 
scientific enterprises is something difficult to sympathize with before subsistence 
needs are widely secured. Addressing the current level of deprivation half of the 
world population lives in is something most people would prioritize. Others may 
also question the need of engaging in more science and technology development 
before the benefits of existing inventions are widely shared. 
F. Compulsory licenses
To label the wide use of compulsory licenses as a separate movement or proposal will 
most likely provoke objection. There are however good reasons to treat them here 
as one of the many proposals being discussed. Compulsory licenses recognize that 
intellectual property rights can be abused and that the way innovators may use these 
rights may run counter to public interests. The legal tool of a compulsory license 
entitles a government to override exclusive rights granted by a patent. States using 
compulsory licenses still agree that the patent holder is entitled to remuneration, 
but they reserve the right to establish what an adequate remuneration consists of.
Having predecessors in national jurisdictions, this tool was also established 
in the trips agreement, and has been reaffirmed in the Doha Declaration on the 
trips Agreement and Public Health, November 2001[96].
Using compulsory licenses can be decided democratically, but governments 
often have to fear retaliation measures by the patent holder’s country of origin. 
The decision can be affirmed or rejected by international arbitration. 
Criticism: Compulsory licenses have some short-term benefits, however when 
widely used or the threat of their use exists it discourages innovation in the affected 
to complementarity, 325-327.
94. A2K treaty (draft), art. 7.1.
95. trips, art. 40.2.
96. See trips agreement, article 31.
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field. The easiest escape from losing on research and development investment is to 
do research in areas where recouping one’s capital is safe. Companies can simply 
avoid doing research in areas that will provide solutions specially targeted for the 
needy97. Thus, in the long run compulsory licenses do not solve the problem of 
access to the benefits of science and may even have a negative effect in aligning 
scientific agendas with the problems of the poor. 
Enhancing participation possibilities is generally not addressed, at least for the 
very poor. An exception occurs when exclusive rights on broad patents are revoked, 
thus enabling again follow-on innovation by other companies as well. 
Little is gained for the right to self-determination. Compulsory licenses allow 
only choosing from what is already invented. 
VI. A brief overall assessment of the alternatives
After examining the different proposals, the question is raised: which one of them 
should be favoured? This demands a clear assessment of the benefits and shortco-
mings of each one of them. Before this can be done, we have to recall that some 
of the disadvantages apparent in the proposals are actually deliberate concessions 
made toward political feasibility. The meaning of what concessions amount to 
is however also subject to a variety of interpretations. An example is Van parijs’ 
understanding of the term: “a concession does not consist of agreeing to receive 
less than one has an interest in obtaining, but rather in agreeing that one will re-
ceive less than what one regards as one’s entitlement”98. A proper use of the term 
would require from us to have a clear notion in regard to what we are entitled to. 
Unfortunately, there is a wide dispute on what our entitlements amount to (or to 
what we are obliged to provide others with), therefore making it inevitable that 
our understandings of what concessions are differ. Thus, three doctrines aiming at 
securing different sets of entitlements will be briefly discussed. Those are the basic 
rights idea, entitlements secured by the International Bill of Rights and notions 
defending rights of future generations. 
Having basic rights secured is a widely shared goal, a common consensus one 
could say. However, here some differences in opinion arise at an early stage. Henry 
Shue defines the right to subsistence as one of the basic rights. He means by this 
that without the minimum securities to ensure subsistence, other rights cannot be 
enjoyed99. The rights that are usually considered as basic are some of those we can 
find in the icescr Articles 11.1 and 12 – the right to health, shelter and food. In 
how far science and technology play an indispensable role in securing those rights 
97. Hollis & Pogge, The Health Impact Fund: Making New Medicines Accessible for 
All 99 f.
98. Philippe van Parijs, What makes a good compromise?, 47 Government and Opposi-
tion 466 (2012).
99. Henry Shue, Basic rights: Subsistance, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy (Princeton 
University Press, 2nd ed., 1996).
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is far from self-evident. 
In relation to health, the link between taking a medicine and a certain health 
outcome is often undeniable. While food is often seen as an even more urgent 
necessity than medicines, the causal relationship between a specific agricultural 
innovation and food security is more difficult to establish. The target of food se-
curity can be achieved by other means than relying on the particular innovation in 
question. Additionally we have special local circumstances that alter the hierarchy 
of the needs that are considered more urgent for human survival than others. 
People living around the polar circles would argue that one cannot be deprived 
of proper clothing and shelter for even less time than of food and medicines. It is 
commonly acknowledged that innovation can play a role to make clothing and 
shelter better suitable for harsh environments, but the securement of those needs 
is even less dependent on a particular technological innovation. 
Thus, in how far a person tends to categorize an object as necessary for securing 
basic rights depends often on perceived vulnerabilities, and those vary according 
to multiple social and geographic factors100. Using the basic goods category to 
identify the objects of innovation that can be exploited without moral scruple 
would only make sense on a global scale if the objects falling within this category 
can be broadly bundled. The diversity of vulnerabilities obliges to offer correlative 
remedies and a prophylactics package. A strict hierarchy of which needs are more 
vital than others is impossible to defend on a global scale. 
A number of technologies fall clearly out of the scope of what is protected by 
the basic rights doctrine, but can nevertheless significantly help to achieve certain 
rights protected by the International Bill of Rights. The importance of many of the 
less urgent human rights cannot be completely ignored by basic rights advocates. 
Since we do not have institutions that redistribute resources in order to guarantee 
that basic subsistence rights are more widely secured, people are compelled to do 
everything in their power to overcome local threats to health, food security and 
generally hazards coming from an exposure to a harsh environment. Having access 
to research networks and a basic infrastructure to undertake experiments enables 
people to seek for solutions on their own. Failing to continuously assist people as 
they fall into distress makes it mandatory to enable them to be able to provide for 
themselves. Securing possibilities to partake in science and technology develop-
ment releases people from a relationship of dependency, a goal that is laudable in 
its own right101.
Copyright limits access to the most recent scholarship and research in the social 
and natural sciences, having the effect that many people are not informed about the 
newest development in fields that concern their daily lives. Being misinformed or 
100. For perceived vulnerabilities, in terms of identifying oneself in a position of dis-
advantage, cf. Jonathan Wolff & Avner De-Shalit, Disadvantage (Oxford University 
Press, 2007).
101. Cf. Timmermann, Sharing.
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having scarce access to information makes citizens vulnerable. Democratic citizen-
ship demands access to information and the tools that make knowledge more widely 
accessible and permit a more open dialogue. This is vital for self-determination.
Lastly, technologies shape not only our current society but also the way fu-
ture people will live their lives. Most likely the next generations will build up on 
technologies we have developed, as we have continued to develop technologies 
our ancestors made available. Science technologies are not neutral in the ethical 
assessment and we are accountable for the direction research agendas have taken. 
Failing to develop an innovation incentive system that allows us to democratically 
steer research agendas is a major omission, which makes the current generation 
responsible for the direction it allowed science to lead. 
The situation of extreme scarcity in which half of the world population lives, 
makes it difficult to abandon a prioritarian position. The suffering caused by mal-
nutrition and disease is so devastating, that access to medicines and work toward 
food security simply have to be prioritized. It makes therefore sense to follow the 
drafters of the Health Impact Fund and offer an incentive system that addresses 
at least one of those major problems. However sticking to addressing subsistence 
needs only will never erase the stigma of strict dependency from the global poor. 
Stimulating South-South collaborations is a great path to a world where people 
assists each other mutually through innovation.  
As a final remark, emphasising the role technology could play should not 
make us neglect wider social problems. While knowledge and the accessibility of 
new innovation may help us achieve a variety of social goals, extreme inequality 
undermines much of the potential benefits we can harvest from innovation. As 
a world of extreme equalities undermines incentives to excel, a world of extreme 
inequalities undermines the achievements of those who have excelled. 
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